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Defamation and John Does: Increased Protections
and Relaxed Standing Requirements for Anonymous
Internet Speech
I. INTRODUCTION
With the onslaught of blogging and discussion forums on the
Internet, the marketplace of ideas has undergone a dramatic
expansion.1 One commentator has suggested that “the Internet may
. . . be the greatest innovation in speech since the invention of the
printing press.”2 Another has praised the democratizing effects of the
Internet, observing that “[t]he Internet is a democratic institution in
the fullest sense. It serves as the modern equivalent of Speakers’
Corner in England’s Hyde Park, where ordinary people may voice
”
their opinions . . . . 3 One reason that the Internet facilitates speech
so effectively may be that it makes it incredibly easy for a speaker to
veil his or her identity while simultaneously reaching a vast audience,
which was previously difficult, or even impossible with a traditional
flier or handbill. At least one court has noted the value of anonymity
on the Internet.
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by
the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously. . . .
Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging
exchange of ideas. . . . For this reason, the constitutional rights of
Internet users, including the First Amendment right to speak
anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded.4

 I thank Associate Professor RonNell Andersen Jones for her guidance and helpful
input on earlier drafts.
1. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 21 (2007) (estimating that there were over fifty million blogs on
the Internet by the end of July 2006).
2. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2000).
3. Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy
Information Center as Amici Curiae at 5, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50
WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002); see also Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“The Internet is a truly democratic forum for communication. It
allows for the free exchange of ideas at an unprecedented speed and scale.”).
4. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091–93, 1097.
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However, other commentators have argued that anonymity
decreases speaker accountability and therefore increases the potential
for “irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication.” 5
The flash flood of anonymous speech that has surged into the
cyber marketplace of ideas has brought with it complex legal issues
that have challenged existing First Amendment doctrines in many
areas, particularly in regards to the issue of potentially defamatory
anonymous speech. One commentator noted, “[A]s the Internet
turns more ordinary John Does into publishers, it is also turning
them into defamation defendants.”6 These defamation cases have
ranged from derogatory sexual comments directed at unsuspecting
college students,7 to political criticism of company policies.8 In such
cases, aggrieved plaintiffs have sought to unveil the identity of the
allegedly defamatory speakers through a court order. However, the
difficulty in making such a determination about a speaker’s identity is
that “the decision is usually made at the outset of litigation, before a
full record may be developed,” and this is a “critical, and often
outcome-determinative, decision.”9
In light of these issues, this Comment seeks to address two
important questions that the Supreme Court has yet to answer. First,
what must a private plaintiff do in order to discover the identity of a
speaker through the use of a civil subpoena in a defamation action;10
and second, which parties have standing to assert the rights of

5. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 (D. Nev.
2008).
6. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 945 (2000).
7. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008).
8. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001);
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d, on
other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377
(Va. 2001); see also Konrad Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty
and the Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity before Service of Process is
Effected, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2; Konrad S. Lee, Hiding From the Boss Online: The
Anti-Employer Blogger’s Legal Quest for Anonymity, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 135 (2006).
9. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive
Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 799 (2004). Furthermore, Vogel
points out: “What is worse, the decision will often be subject to only limited appellate review .
. . .” Id. For this reason, some courts have argued that there ought to be heightened appellate
review for the determination of whether to disclose a speaker’s identity. See, e.g., Melvin v.
Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003).
10. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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anonymous speakers on the Internet? This Comment answers these
questions by proposing a new test to balance the competing interests
presented in this area of the law and by arguing that third-party
standing requirements should be relaxed to prevent speech from
being chilled.
In Part II, this Comment analyzes the legal development of
defamation law and the most recent case law dealing with
anonymous Internet speech. In Part III, this Comment argues that
current standards are insufficient to protect the rights of anonymous
speakers and, further, that third-party standing requirements should
be relaxed so that more powerful organizations, like Internet service
providers (“ISPs”), trade organizations, communication forums, or
even press organizations are able to assert the protections that are
afforded to anonymous Internet speakers. Part III also proposes
solutions to meet the competing interests presented in this area of
the law. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
This Part proceeds in four Parts. Part A discusses First
Amendment protections of anonymous speech. Part B looks at the
evolution of defamation law. Part C considers the unique challenge
of protecting potentially defamatory anonymous speech on the
Internet. Part D concludes this Part by setting forth the current
standards of protection for anonymous Internet speakers.
A. First Amendment Protections of Anonymous Speech
The Supreme Court has clearly recognized a First Amendment
right to speak anonymously.11 The Court has found that the freedom
of conscience is housed in the First Amendment and that this
freedom includes the freedom to speak, as well as the freedom to
choose not to speak.12 The right to not speak includes the right of a
speaker not to disclose his or her identity. For instance, in Talley v.
California, the Court found an ordinance prohibiting distribution of
anonymous handbills invalid on its face.13 The Court explained that

11. E.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
12. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
13. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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“[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history
have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all.”14
Similarly, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court
invalidated an election law that prohibited the anonymous
circulation of leaflets.15 The Court explained that “[a]nonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the
purpose behind . . . the First Amendment,” which is to protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from
suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”16 In Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion, he provided historic evidence that the
Framers felt the right to speak anonymously was a critical component
of the freedom of speech. Thomas cited examples of the Federalist
Papers that were published under the pseudonym of “Publius,”17 as
well as the famous Zenger trial of 1735, which involved a printer
who refused to reveal the “anonymous authors of published attacks
on the Crown governor of New York.”18 When the governor could
not retrieve the identity of the speakers, he prosecuted the printer for
libel.19 However, the jury refused to convict the defendant. Thomas
also cited the example of the Anti-Federalist attack on the Federalist
editors’ policy against allowing writers to publish anonymous works.
Thomas argued that this “historical evidence indicates that
Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that
anonymous authors reveal their identities.”20 Thus, the Supreme
Court very clearly protected First Amendment rights of speakers who
wished to remain anonymous.21
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not held that there is
anything unique about speech on the Internet that should qualify
this right to speak anonymously. The Supreme Court found that its
precedent “provide[d] no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”22

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Id. at 64.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 360–61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363–64.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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B. The Evolution of Defamation Law

The freedom of speech, however, is not absolute. Certain types
of speech, such as defamation, have long been considered to be, to
some extent, outside the realm of First Amendment protection.
According to the Restatement of Torts, the elements of an
actionable defamation claim include first, a false and defamatory
statement
concerning
another;
second,
an
unprivileged
communication to a third-party; third, fault amounting to at least
negligence on the part of the publisher (though the amount of fault
changes depending on the status of the individual who was targeted
by the defamatory speech); and fourth, some sort of damages or
harm caused.23
After overcoming the obstacle of presenting a prima facie
defamation case, the plaintiff must then overcome First Amendment
protections. Originally, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court
provided no protection for libelous speech, explaining that “[t]here
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which ha[ve] never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include . . . the
libelous . . . .”24 The Court explained that because libelous or
defamatory speech was viewed as having such “slight social value,” it
was not entitled to First Amendment protection.25
The Court provided much more generous protections for
potentially libelous speech in New York Times v. Sullivan when it
articulated a standard that swept libelous speech into the realm of
First Amendment protection, with specific limitations.26 The
countervailing interests that the Court identified were the need to
protect the reputations of individuals, versus the strong First
Amendment interest in free expression, which could be chilled or
limited if tort liability were too strong.27
In an attempt to strike a balance between these competing
interests, the Court articulated a standard that varied depending on
the status of the individual targeted by the speech. If the individual is
a public official, he or she cannot recover damages for a defamatory

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphasis added).
Id. at 572.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 281; id. at 301 (Black, J., concurring).
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falsehood relating to official conduct unless he or she proves that the
statement was made with actual malice, which is defined as willful
falsity or reckless disregard of whether the statement was false.28
Later cases found that if the target of speech is a private figure who
has not voluntarily thrust himself or herself into the public sphere or
achieved a great deal of fame and notoriety, then the plaintiff need
only prove that the speech was negligent by a preponderance of the
evidence.29
The Sullivan Court explained that the justification for giving
such strong First Amendment protections to libelous speech was
based on “a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks . . . .”30 Furthermore, the Court reasoned
that even false statements were deserving of protection at times,
because “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and [must]
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing
space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”31
C. The Unique Challenge of Protecting Potentially Defamatory
Anonymous Speech on the Internet
The Supreme Court has not articulated a clear rule or balancing
test to determine when the government may pierce the veil of
anonymity of speakers on the Internet who have posted allegedly
defamatory statements. This type of speech presents its own set of
unique challenges. First, it is important to note that when a court
forces a speaker to disclose his or her identity, the court is going
beyond the ordinary civil punishment for defamatory speech; the

28. Id. at 280 (majority opinion). In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967), and Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967), the Court extended this malice
standard to persons who were not public officials, but who were public figures in issues in
which the public has an important and justified interest.
29. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
31. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). This
combination of tort and constitutional hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome to establish a
defamation claim makes it incredibly difficult for defamation claims to succeed. Indeed, as
Professor Lidsky notes, “Empirical studies confirm that the practical effect of these labyrinthine
doctrines is to make it almost impossible for any plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action.
Statistics show that only 13% of plaintiffs ultimately prevail in libel litigation . . . .” Lidsky,
supra note 6, at 875.
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court is actually compelling the anonymous individual to speak his or
her identity, thereby directly interfering with the individual’s
freedom of speech. Thus, even though defamatory speech loses some
of its First Amendment protection, the speaker’s identity is separate
from defamatory speech and ought to carry separate First
Amendment protections.
Second, at least one court has observed that “there is reason to
believe that many defamation plaintiffs bring suit merely to unmask
the identities of anonymous critics.”32 Indeed, one commentator
suggests that Internet defamation actions are often “not really about
money,” but are rather motivated by a belief in the social,
psychological, or symbolic benefits.33 In other words, many plaintiffs
bring these suits purely for vindictive reasons and literally have
nothing to lose should their suit not be successful. This observation
raises particular concerns in the area of anonymous speech because if
plaintiffs are able to bring superfluous lawsuits, regardless of the
validity of the claim, then they could do so merely to strip the
speaker of anonymity. Plaintiffs could then bring an Internet SLAPP
suit (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) solely to harass
and silence critics.34 Thus, if the standards for protecting the identity
of an anonymous speaker were no greater than the requirements for
a prima facie libel case, many speakers could be stripped of their
anonymity, literally, as a punishment for unappreciated speech that is
not necessarily defamatory.
The Internet in particular provides a dramatic setting to contrast
these competing interests. Courts have recognized the democratizing
power of the Internet, in that “through the use of [the Internet],
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice
that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”35 As one
commentator notes:
The promise of the Internet is empowerment: it empowers ordinary
individuals with limited financial resources to “publish” their views
on matters of public concern. The Internet is therefore a powerful
tool for equalizing imbalances of power by giving voice to the
32. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
33. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 872, 876.
34. Id. at 865. SLAPP suits are illegal in about half of the states, as noted in Krinsky v.
Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 245 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), but this still leaves quite a large
number of states where anonymous speakers can be harassed for their speech.
35. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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disenfranchised and by allowing more democratic participation in
public discourse. In other words, the Internet allows ordinary John
Does to participate as never before in public discourse, and hence,
to shape public policy.36

If strategic or superfluous suits are engaged in by “powerful
corporate Goliaths [who] sue their critics for speaking their minds,”
then this promise of equalizing power will be lost and the
“hierarchies of power” that exist in other media forms will be
reestablished.37
On the other hand, the Internet can be a dangerous tool in the
hands of an irresponsible speaker determined to ruin reputations.
One court observed that
where speakers remain anonymous there is . . . a great potential for
irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication, and . . . lack
of accountability . . . . This is particularly true where the speed and
power of Internet technology make it difficult for the truth to
‘catch up’ to the lie.38

One example of an individual who abused the right to speak
anonymously was the CEO of La Jolla Club, who posted over one
hundred negative messages about La Jolla’s competitor, Callaway
Golf Company, while simultaneously trading in Callaway’s stocks.39
Thus, by establishing too strong of First Amendment protections for
anonymous Internet speakers, the law will leave individuals or
organizations that have been victimized by scathing speech, which
spreads at the click of a mouse, with little or no remedy.
Furthermore, other commentators have observed that it may be
difficult for a plaintiff to know if litigation is worth pursuing without

36. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 860–61.
37. Id. at 861; see also Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and
Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae at 8–9, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42
(Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002) (“In a lawsuit filed over anonymous
speech, the identification of the speaker provides an important measure of relief to the plaintiff
because it enables the plaintiff to employ extra-judicial self-help measures to counteract both
the speech and the speaker, and creates a substantial risk of harm to the speaker, who not only
loses the right to anonymous speech but is exposed to the plaintiff’s self-help efforts to restrain
or oppose his speech. In our system of laws, we ordinarily do not give substantial relief of this
sort, even on a preliminary basis, absent proof that the relief is justified because success is likely
and the balance of hardships favors the relief.”).
38. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 (D. Nev.
2008).
39. Vogel, supra note 9, at 820.
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knowing the identity of the speaker.40 In Melvin v. Doe, the court
explained that a plaintiff “needs to know the identity of the Doe
defendants prior to incurring the expenses and other burdens of a
trial, because it is questionable whether [a] plaintiff would wish to
proceed with a trial if John Doe turned out to be, for example, an
[incarcerated] inmate . . . .”41 Thus it is clear that there are strong
competing interests both against and in favor of disclosing the
identity of the anonymous speaker.
D. Current Standards of Protection for Anonymous Internet Speakers
Laws relating to anonymous Internet speakers have evolved to
provide greater protections over time. In the 1990s, it was common
practice for Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to simply provide
companies or other aggrieved individuals with the identifying
information of anonymous speakers upon request.42 In other
situations, attorneys would draft invalid subpoenas (not issued by the
court) to obtain anonymous identities, and even in cases where
subpoenas were issued by the court, “the discovery was almost
uniformly granted.”43
Both courts and legislatures, however, began to recognize a need
for heightened protection for the identity of anonymous speakers. A
few states statutorily protected the rights of anonymous speakers
through use of state shield laws by finding the comments made were
a portion of the press’s “news gathering” function,44 while other
states used different statutes to protect the speakers’ rights.45 Quite a
few states and lower federal courts began to address the actual First
Amendment right of the speakers and tried to determine what the

40. Id. at 808.
41. 49 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 453 (2000), appeal quashed on other grounds, 789 A.2d 696
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), rev’d, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003).
42. Vogel, supra note 9, at 802.
43. Id. at 802–03.
44. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Beal v.
Calobrisi, No. 08-CA-1075 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2008); Alton Tel. v. People, No. 08-MR548 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Madison County May 15, 2009); Doty v. Molnar, No. DV 07-022 (Mont.
Dist. Ct., Yellowstone County Sept. 3, 2008); Doe v. TS, No. 08030693 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept.
30, 2008).
45. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2703(d), 157 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Interscope Records v. Does 1–7, 494 F.
Supp. 2d 388 (E.D. Va. 2007); Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
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appropriate balance should be between protecting speakers’ First
Amendment rights while still providing an adequate remedy to
individuals who had potentially been defamed, and a few cases have
arisen as seminal.
The first seminal case is Columbia Insurance Co. v.
Seescandy.com, which, though not dealing with defamation, was a
case on which many later defamation cases relied.46 The plaintiff in
Seescandy.com sued for trademark infringement and other business
torts,47 and the court held that in order for the plaintiff to uncover
the identity of the anonymous speakers, the plaintiff should first,
“identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the
Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who
could be sued in federal court”;48 second, the plaintiff must describe
the steps taken to locate the defendant and demonstrate a good faith
effort to comply with service of process;49 third, the plaintiff must
present a prima facie case that could withstand a motion to dismiss;50
and fourth, plaintiff must file a motion for request of specific
discovery with the court, accompanied by reasons for the request as
well as identification of a limited number of persons on whom
discovery should be served.51 One commentator noted that although
the court in this case mentioned a motion to dismiss standard, the
standard that was applied was actually quite a bit higher.52
In Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, a subsequent
defamation case in New Jersey, the court relied upon the reasoning
in Seescandy.com, and it specifically incorporated the motion to
dismiss prong of the test.53 Dendrite involved a defamation action in
46. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Although
not directly dealing with defamatory, anonymous speakers on the Internet, Seescandy.com did
provide a helpful discussion of the competing interests applicable in such a case. See id. at 578.
47. Id. at 576.
48. Id. at 578.
49. Id. at 579.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 580.
52. “While the Seescandy.com opinion uses the phrase ‘motion to dismiss,’ implying a
minimal level of scrutiny, the court makes clear that it means to require more than that,
although how much more is left unsaid. In particular, the court holds that ‘[a] conclusory
pleading will never be sufficient’ but, instead of analyzing the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ requirement, it suggests an
inquiry analogous to the ‘probable cause’ inquiry in criminal procedure.” Vogel, supra note 9,
at 805.
53. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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which a corporation sought the identity of an anonymous speaker
who had made defamatory statements about the company on a
Yahoo! bulletin.54 The court denied the plaintiff’s request to obtain
the identity of the speaker and set forth the steps that must be taken
before disclosing the speaker’s identity. The plaintiff must first, make
an effort to notify the anonymous speaker and give a reasonable
period to allow him to file an opposing position; second, the plaintiff
must identify the exact statements alleged to constitute actionable
speech; third, the plaintiff must set forth a prima facie cause of action
that is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss; and fourth, if the
prima facie case is presented, the court must “balance the
defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech
against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the
necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to
allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”55
Another important standard that was developed near the time of
Dendrite was articulated in Doe v. 2TheMart.com.56 This court
required first, that the subpoena be issued in good faith and not for
an improper purpose; second, that the identifying information
sought be directly and materially related to a core aspect of the claim
or defense; and third, that the subpoena be unavailable from other
sources.57 In this case, a company sought the identity of anonymous
speakers who participated on Internet message boards and made
statements that were critical of the company. Because the company
failed to prove that the identifying information sought was directly
relevant to a core defense, the court found that the speakers’
identities were not needed for the litigation to proceed.58
The most recent major case was Doe No.1 v. Cahill, which first
articulated the summary judgment standard.59 In this case, a local
politician filed a defamation claim against a plaintiff who had made
comments about the politician’s performance on a website related to
public issues.60 The court set forth a standard that requires plaintiffs
to support their claims with facts sufficient to defeat a summary
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 762.
Id. at 760–61.
140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1096.
884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
Id. at 454.
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judgment motion,61 except that plaintiffs need not produce evidence
of things like actual malice, which are outside their control.62 The
Cahill court rejected the balancing test set forth in Dendrite because
it argued that this test added an unnecessary additional protection
that was already provided by the summary judgment standard. The
court explained that the summary judgment analysis itself provides a
balance, and an additional balancing prong would unnecessarily
complicate the analysis.63
III. ANALYSIS
This Part proceeds in Part A by discussing the inadequacy of
current standards of protection for anonymous Internet speakers.
Part B argues for what the author believes to be the appropriate
standard of protection for anonymous Internet speech. Part C
concludes the Part by considering the possibility of additional
protections that could be created by third-party standing asserted on
behalf of anonymous Internet speakers.
A. The Inadequacy of Current Standards of Protection for Anonymous
Internet Speakers
Although many of the tests articulated in the seminal cases
discussed above contain valuable portions of a standard to protect
speech, none of them clearly articulated a framework that adequately
meets the competing interests of protecting free expression and
remedying damaged reputations. This section will analyze the
shortcomings of each of the tests in turn.
While in many respects Dendrite has led to great progress in the
protections for anonymous Internet speakers,64 the test still has
61. Id. at 457.
62. Id. at 464.
63. Id. at 461.
64. Vogel explains that, “On the whole, though statistics are difficult to come by, there
appears to be a substantial reduction since Dendrite in lawsuits targeting anonymous Internet
posters.” Vogel, supra note 9, at 812. Other commentators have described Dendrite as “a
tremendous victory for free speech.” Id. at 810–811 (citing Mary P. Gallagher, Court Erects
Roadblocks to Flagging Cyberspammers on the Internet: Four-Step Process Must Be Followed Before
Forcing ISP to Disclose, 165 N.J. L.J. 203 (2001)). Others have referred to it as “a ‘fair,
workable test that stems the tide of using the threat of the subpoena power to punish people
for criticizing others online’ . . . [but that] ‘doesn’t close the courthouse door to those with
meritorious claims.’” Stephen R. Buckingham & Alix R. Rubin, Anonymous ‘Posters’
Complicate Discovery, Nov. 19, 2001 N.Y. L.J. s4, (col. 3) (citation omitted).
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significant room for improvement. Though the first two prongs of
the Dendrite standard (notice and setting forth exact defamatory
statements) are fairly uncontroversial,65 the next two prongs have
raised eyebrows among various commentators. Arguably, the most
interesting and unique aspect of the test is the fourth prong, which
embodies a typical balancing test. This prong allows the court more
leeway to analyze the competing interests of the speaker and plaintiff
on a case-by-case basis, but the test also leaves courts with a great
deal of discretion (and very little guidance) to determine whether the
First Amendment right or prima facie case is more important.
Some scholars find this prong quite troubling, because the court
is in effect saying that even if plaintiffs have alleged a viable legal
claim against the anonymous speaker and supported the claim with
sufficient evidence, the court may still dismiss the claim. For
example, Vogel said, “This is an exceedingly broad level of authority
to grant to a single, trial-level judge, and is inconsistent with the
spirit of such rights as due process and the right to trial by
jury . . . .”66 Indeed, this high level of discretion is illustrated even by
the Dendrite court, which held that the plaintiffs had insufficiently
proved damages to support their claim, whereas in a parallel case
decided by the same court, the court did not even require a showing
of damages.67
The third prong of this test may also be problematic in that the
ability of a plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to support a prima
facie case sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “will often depend
dispositively on the identity of the defendant.”68 In addition, since
“proving damages may involve complicated (and expensive) expert
testimony concerning matters such as the effect of postings on stock
prices, a plaintiff has a strong interest in knowing whether the

65. Though some courts have noted that the notice requirement should only be
completed if possible and/or necessary. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 244–45 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008). For example, the chat room may no longer be in existence, or the defendant
may have already been notified by the ISP.
66. Vogel, supra note 9, at 808.
67. Id. at 809.
68. Id. at 807. “For example, when ‘actual malice’ is an element of a defamation claim,
the plaintiff will need to know the defendant’s identity, and in all likelihood take the
defendant’s deposition, to meet that burden. Likewise, where the poster is a competitor,
discovery may be focused on the competitor’s efforts to lure customers or employees away
from the plaintiff. Where stock manipulation is suspected, the defendant’s trading records will
be essential to proving damages.” Id. at 807–08 (footnote omitted).
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defendant has the financial means to satisfy a judgment before
investing the resources in gathering such evidence.”69 Furthermore,
basing First Amendment protections on a procedural hurdle that
varies among jurisdictions seems like a risky and unpredictable
practice, as will be discussed in greater detail below.
As for the test in 2TheMart.com, though it provides valuable
standards for analysis in the second and third prongs, its first
requirement that the suit need merely be brought in good faith does
not provide enough protection to anonymous speakers.
Commentators have observed that
[t]he problem with this type of test is the ease with which it can be
abused. Because it is so deferential, a plaintiff whose real interest is
in identifying the speaker to embarrass or harass him or her has to
show very little before the court will unmask the speaker.70

One court noted that the good faith requirement is an inadequate
standard of determination because “a plaintiff may well be in actual
subjective good faith in filing the suit believing he has a strong case
when, in fact, he may have no case at all.”71 Conversely, a plaintiff
who has a strong defamation case with a good chance of winning
may care very little about winning the case and care much more
about the social, psychological, and symbolic benefits of bringing a
defamation case.72 Thus, there should be some objective legal
standard to determine whether the claim brought is sufficient to
justify piercing the veil of anonymity.73

69. Id. at 808.
70. Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: How Far Should First
Amendment Protection of Anonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 421,
426 (2009).
71. In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *37 (W.D. La.
Dec. 19, 2001).
72. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 872, 876.
73. At least one court has argued that the determination of discovery of an anonymous
speaker’s identity should not require “consideration of the merits of the underlying defamation
action.” Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46 (Pa. 2003). “Rather, the [analysis should be] strictly
a legal [question], entailing consideration of what threshold requirements must be imposed as
a prerequisite to discovery in an anonymous defamation case . . . .” This inquiry, the court
argued, should be “plainly separable from the defamation action.” Id. However, it is highly
debatable whether completely separating the inquiry from the merits of the case would be wise,
or even possible. Even the most basic civil procedures, such as pleadings, must give at least
some weight to the merits of a case. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545–
46 (2007). Thus, while the legal standard must be objective, it cannot exist in a vacuum,
isolated from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.

1322

DO NOT DELETE

1309

12/20/2010 1:03:11 PM

Defamation and John Does

The Cahill summary judgment standard, at first glance, may
appear to be the optimal solution. It has increased protections for
anonymous speakers by raising the bar from the usual motion to
dismiss standard to requiring a factual showing sufficient to create a
material issue of fact for elements of the claim within the plaintiff’s
control. Yet the Cahill standard still allows for a speaker to obtain
remedies through the clear procedure of meeting the evidentiary
requirements to survive a summary judgment motion. Since this test
rejects the subjective balancing test set forth in Dendrite, the Cahill
test implements a clear, categorical rule, which almost without
exception provides more predictability and clarity in the law. The
justification for removing the balancing test set forth in Dendrite is
that the underlying substantive defamation law already includes a
balancing test, which is true when you consider that public figures
must overcome the heavier First Amendment “thumb on the scale”
by proving actual malice (intentional false statements or reckless
disregard of the falsity of statements).74 Private figures must also
overcome a presumption against them, albeit a smaller presumption,
by proving that the speech was at least negligent.75
However, examining the underlying “balancing test” in the
summary judgment standard unveils a serious flaw in the analysis set
forth by Cahill: this test requires only that plaintiffs support their
claims with the elements within their control, and this category
excludes things like actual malice or negligence, which are outside the
plaintiff’s control. By excluding the requirement that a plaintiff prove
these motives, the summary judgment test has effectively gutted all
First Amendment hurdles that weighed down the scale in favor of
the speaker, and thus the underlying “balancing test” is shown to be,
in fact, non-existent. However, it would be impossible to require the
plaintiff to prove actual malice or negligence without the identity of
the speaker, and thus this aspect of the test seems to have reached a
constitutional impasse.
In addition, one court has criticized the use of a procedural
hurdle as a method of First Amendment protection. This criticism
applies to both the Dendrite motion to dismiss hurdle as well as the
Cahill summary judgment hurdle. One court seeking to apply the
divergent standards said, “We find it unnecessary and potentially

74. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280 (1964).
75. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1974).
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confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment
or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a plaintiff seeking
the identity of an anonymous speaker on the Internet.”76 The court
pointed out that the standards governing pleadings and motions
differ among jurisdictions, and consequently, using a procedural
hurdle to define First Amendment protections can cause both
confusion as well as inconsistency in application.77 For example, the
court pointed out that in a notice pleading state the second
requirement of Dendrite, that the defamatory statements must be set
forth with particularity, will be essential, whereas in jurisdictions
where pleading is more rigorous, such a requirement will be
superfluous because specific statements will need to have already
been included in the pleadings.78
The deficiencies in these various tests led the Krinsky court to
argue that heightened standards of protection for anonymous
Internet speakers actually lead to more harm than good and that
current litigation procedures are sufficient for protecting anonymous
speakers.79 However, a standard that relies purely on current
litigation procedures for defamation claims suffers from the same
issue as mentioned in the above paragraph: namely, First
Amendment protections rely upon procedural labels that differ
among jurisdictions, creating an inconsistent and confusing
application of the law. Furthermore, failing to give additional
protections to the identity of anonymous speakers ignores the fact
that a speaker’s identity is separate from the defamatory speech, and
while courts are able to levy penalties for defamatory speech through
following the guidelines of New York Times v. Sullivan, compelling
an anonymous individual to speak his or her identity is a separate
instance of speech that deserves a separate First Amendment analysis.
B. The Appropriate Standard of Protection for Anonymous
Internet Speech
While it would be impossible to come up with a perfect
categorical rule that properly balances the competing interests in

76. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 244–45, 245 n.12 (relying on views expressed by attorney and scholar
Michael S. Vogel).
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each case, this Comment argues that the following steps of analysis
would be most effective in providing adequate protection for the
identity of an anonymous speaker in a discovery request, while still
allowing aggrieved plaintiffs to obtain a deserved remedy without
facing undue burdens. First, the court must determine whether the
speaker spoke in a reasonably anonymous manner; second, the
plaintiff must present sufficient facts and evidence that the claim is
fairly plausible; third, the identity of the speaker must be materially
related to a core claim or defense of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
must not be able to obtain that information from any other source;
and finally, the plaintiff must attempt to provide reasonable notice to
the anonymous speaker. The first two prongs of the proposed test
are new steps of analysis, not currently utilized in any seminal cases.
The second two prongs of the proposed test have been incorporated
from existing tests in a new way. Each prong of the test will be
discussed in turn.
First, as a threshold matter, the court should determine whether
the anonymous speaker spoke in a forum and in a manner that made
it reasonable for the speaker to believe the speech was anonymous.80
This prong is likely easily met, but it is important to address because
if the speaker has already disclosed his or her identity, allowed his or
her identity to be disclosed, or spoken in a forum or manner where
the speaker knew or should have known that his or her identity
would be disclosed, then there is no need for the courts to provide
heightened protections to the anonymous speaker’s identity. This
issue was raised in Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., where the
plaintiff argued that the defendant had already waived his
constitutional right to anonymity by voluntarily contacting the
recipient in a misleading manner with harassing e-mails concerning
the plaintiff’s mental health and other private matters.81 The court
found that in this case it was justifiable to unveil the identity of the
anonymous speaker.82
80. “It is difficult to speak anonymously in electronic communication without leaving a
small piece of identifying information behind—in the case of internet speech it is the speaker’s
internet protocol (IP) address, which is unique to each user. The address can be masked, but
often people who speak anonymously on the internet are unaware they are leaving a digital
fingerprint behind and fail to cover their tracks.” Jones, supra note 70, at 424 (footnote
omitted).
81. Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328, 331, 343 (Ct. C.P. Pa.
2004).
82. Id. at 351–52.
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Second, rather than rely on a procedural label like surviving a
motion to dismiss or a summary judgment, or subjectively requiring
the case to be brought in “good faith,” the plaintiff’s pleading
should allege sufficient facts to support a fairly plausible (rather than
a merely conceivable) claim for relief in order to pierce the veil of
anonymity.83 This requirement is similar to a standard set forth by a
Louisiana court attempting to apply a workable standard for
defamation actions against anonymous speakers.84 The court argued
that rather than applying overly burdensome and inconsistent
procedural hurdles as a First Amendment protection, the
requirement should be “a showing of at least a reasonable probability
or a reasonable possibility of recovery on the defamation claim.”85
The reason such a requirement is necessary in the realm of
defamation actions against anonymous speakers is because “libel suits
are hard to win but easy to bring.”86 Thus, this requirement would
avoid inconsistent and unduly burdensome procedural hurdles or
subjective good faith requirements but still require a sufficient
showing to ensure that the claim being brought is valid and not
merely superfluous.
Of course, as in Cahill, the plaintiff will only be able to plead the
elements of the claim that are within the plaintiff’s control—
specifically that the statements are false, that the communication was
viewed by unprivileged third parties, and that some sort of harm was
caused.87 Notably, it is not possible to require the plaintiff to prove
negligence or malice at this stage of the litigation. If this test were
the only protection for the identity of anonymous speakers that this
Comment offered, then this test would suffer from the same
shortcomings as Cahill, since the requirement of showing malice is
no longer present, and thus a substantial First Amendment
83. This is essentially the heightened pleading standard recently set forth by the
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (explaining that
this heightened standard is not “a probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged facts). Because
this standard is only applicable to federal courts, it will be useful to require this heightened
pleading standard as an element of the anonymous speech analysis in order to ensure consistent
heightened protection for anonymous speech in all jurisdictions, particularly ones that only
require notice pleading.
84. In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *38 (W.D. La.
Dec. 19, 2001).
85. Id.
86. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 883.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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protection of speech is no longer present. However, as discussed in
the subsequent paragraph, there are additional First Amendment
protections that should be put in place in order to ensure that
separate consideration is given to the importance of preserving the
anonymous identity of a speaker.
Third, even if the plaintiff has sufficiently pled the elements of
the claim within the plaintiff’s control, the plaintiff should be
required to go a step further in order to pierce the veil of anonymity.
He or she should have to prove that the knowledge of the
anonymous speaker’s identity is directly and materially related to a
core claim or defense and that this information is unavailable from
any other source. This is essentially the test that comes from
2TheMart.com.88 This test is, in essence, a variation of a strict scrutiny
requirement, in that it requires a strong interest on the part of the
plaintiff (the central need for the information) and that the request
be narrowly tailored to that need (in that there must be no other
alternative to retrieve the information). It is important that some
variation of strict scrutiny be applied when unmasking a speaker’s
anonymity because, as previously discussed, the government is
compelling speech through a court order in such an instance. Thus,
this is a government action that goes beyond merely punishing
defamatory speech, and thus deserves a separate analysis. As the
Court has explained in McIntyre, when the government interferes
with the content of speech by compelling an individual to speak his
or her identity, such action must be subjected to strict scrutiny.89
Some courts have criticized the 2TheMart.com requirement that
identifying information be unavailable from other sources. For
example, one court stated, “the requirement . . . in 2TheMart.com
that the information is unavailable from any other source, is, it seems
to me, irrelevant.”90 The court argued that it makes no difference
whether the “plaintiff attempts to learn the identi[ty] by some other
‘available means’ or [whether] he attempts to learn it by
subpoena.”91 However, it is important to note that “[a] court order,
88. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
89. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”).
90. In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *36 (W.D. La.
Dec. 19, 2001).
91. Id. at 37.
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even when issued at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit,
constitutes state action and as such is subject to constitutional
limitations.”92 Thus, requiring a showing of a compelling interest
(that the identity is materially related to a core claim) and narrow
tailoring (that the information cannot be obtained otherwise), courts
ensure that the government is intervening only when necessary, and
such a limitation on government action is exactly the purpose of the
Constitution.
Finally, a plaintiff must make reasonable efforts, if necessary, to
notify the anonymous speaker of the litigation and provide a
reasonable period to allow for filing an opposing position as
suggested in Dendrite.93 Thus, if speakers wish to intervene and
defend their own rights in the litigation, they will have that option.94
However, as suggested by the Krinsky court, this requirement need
only be fulfilled if possible and/or necessary.95 For example, the
forum of speech may no longer be in existence to notify the speaker,
or the speaker may have already been notified by the ISP.96
In summary, this proposed test, unlike Dendrite, does not leave
an excessive amount of discretion with the courts. Furthermore, it
requires consistency in application, unlike the procedural
mechanisms of Dendrite or Cahill, while still requiring a slightly
increased showing on the part of the plaintiff at the pleading stage of
the litigation. Finally, it requires that some variation of strict scrutiny
be applied to ensure that the anonymous individual is not compelled
to reveal his or her own identity unless the plaintiff has a compelling
interest in the information (it is related to a core claim or defense)
and is narrowly tailored to the interest (it cannot be obtained from
another source). However, in addition to this standard of protection,
there is one other procedural mechanism necessary to satisfactorily

92. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that “the action of state courts
and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State . . . is a
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.”). See also
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091–92; see also, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
93. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
94. See, e.g., La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, No.
CV030197400S, 2003 WL 22962857, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (allowing the
speaker to choose to intervene in a case when the ISP notified the speaker of the litigation).
95. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
96. Id.
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protect an anonymous speaker’s identity: allowing third-party
standing, as discussed below.
C. Additional Protections Created by Third-Party Standing Asserted
on Behalf of Anonymous Internet Speakers
Though the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, it is
possible that other organizations entrusted with the identity of
anonymous Internet speakers could assert First Amendment rights
on behalf of speakers and quash a subpoena for their identities
through use of third-party standing, or jus tertii. These organizations
might include the ISP,97 an association,98 the group to which the
possibly defamatory speech was initially spoken,99 a company on
behalf of a subscriber,100 the organization that hosts the
communication forum,101 or even a press organization that posts
stories online and allows anonymous commentary.102
If powerful organizations such as these were able to assert First
Amendment rights on behalf of an anonymous speaker, at least two
very important phenomena would occur. First, in many cases, the
addition of a more powerful player in defense of anonymous speakers
would reduce the risk that previous regimes of power be
reestablished, thus preserving the promise of equality and
empowerment on the Internet.103 It goes without saying that the
groups mentioned above (associations, companies, or the press, etc.)
often have many more resources—politically, financially, legally—
than the average John Doe and are thus much better prepared to
engage in litigation. As a result, these groups are less likely than John
Doe to be intimidated by superfluous lawsuits from large companies
or to cave under the pressure from such organizations.104
97. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds by RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
98. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
99. Solers, 977 A.2d at 941.
100. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244; Am. Online, Inc. v. Nam
Tai Elecs., Inc., 571 S.E.2d 128 (Va. 2002).
101. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
102. Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-cv-1934, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa.
2008).
103. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 860–61.
104. The vast amount of influence and intimidation that plaintiffs can exert against
defendants in a defamation action, even without a formal trial, is illustrated by the example of
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The second phenomenon that would occur under this scheme
would naturally be an increased amount of information and a
decrease in self-censorship among anonymous speakers. This
Comment will discuss in more detail the extensive chilling effect that
forcing anonymous speakers to defend themselves in court can have
on anonymous speech in general.
A prudential principle of standing is that “[i]n the ordinary case,
a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.”105
Two traditional justifications of this principle are first that “courts
should not adjudicate . . . rights unnecessarily,” as the holders of the
rights may not want them adjudicated; and second, parties are
usually the “best proponents of their own rights,” which makes for
the most “effective advocacy.”106 However, courts will allow an
exception to the third-party standing prohibition in situations where
three requirements have been met: first, the litigant must have
suffered some sort of injury-in-fact; second, there must be some sort
of relationship between the litigant and the person whose rights the
litigant seeks to assert; and third, there must be some hindrance to
the speaker’s ability to assert personal rights.107
It is important to note that the Court has not required thirdparty “relationships” to be a close familial or professional bond. The
required relationship is a functional relationship, such that the
litigant will be an effective advocate of the rights of the third party.
Indeed, it is not even necessary that the litigants or third parties
know or associate with one another. The Court has, in fact, gone as
far as to find the requisite relationship between many unlikely pairs,
such as between a bartender and an underage drinker,108 a juror and
a criminal defendant,109 and a bookseller and juvenile customers.110

Peter Krum. After a corporate plaintiff threatened Krum with a suit regarding his potentially
defamatory speech, Krum, who only worked as a Fry Cook and only made about $22,000 a
year, “made no effort to contest the suit, but instead agreed to sign an apology, pay $50 a
month to a charity of the plaintiffs’ choice for a period of four years, and to perform three
hours of community service every week for two years.” Id. at 882–83.
105. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977).
106. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976). See also Henry P. Monaghan,
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984).
107. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).
108. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
109. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413.
110. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
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The Court also often requires that the litigant asserting thirdparty standing have some sort of stake in the litigation. For instance,
in Singleton v. Wulff, the court allowed a physician to assert standing
on behalf of his patients seeking abortions because their rights were
tangential to his success in his practice.111 Since the physician had
much to gain by winning the suit, he was in a better position to
advocate the tangential rights of others.
In some cases, it may be possible for third parties to satisfy all of
the strict requirements for the third-party standing exception in
order to assert the rights of anonymous speakers. The first
requirement, that the third party have suffered some kind of
injury,112 which is related to the requirement that the litigant have
some sort of stake in the litigation, may be fairly easy for a party to
prove. For example, in Solers, Inc. v. Doe, an anonymous speaker
informed a trade association that a company had committed acts of
copyright infringement.113 The company filed suit against the speaker
for defamation and subpoenaed the trade association to provide the
identity of the speaker. The trade association asserted the rights of
the anonymous speaker through third-party standing and moved to
quash the subpoena. Part of the reason that the trade association
chose to do so was because the company had a “long standing policy
of keeping the identity of [its] sources anonymous (unless required
by law to disclose the identity) [and] . . . maintain[ing] as
confidential the information provided by its sources[.]”114 Thus, the
trade association had an interest in defending the rights of the tipster
in order to protect the reputation of the association in keeping the
tipster’s identity anonymous.115 By not allowing the association to
assert the speaker’s rights, the association’s reputation for upholding
its policy would be damaged, and there would be less reporting by

111. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 106 (1976).
112. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991).
113. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009).
114. Id. at 946.
115. It is important to note that the third-party organization would not be obligated to
raise the rights of commentators on its website. Furthermore, as a result of the
Communications Decency Act, Internet service providers arguably cannot be held liable for
speech made by commentators on the site. See David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet,
61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 174–75 (1997). Cf. Rachel Kurth, Striking a Balance Between Section
230 of the Protecting Civil Rights and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. The
Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805 (2007).
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tipsters in the future as a result of the association’s damaged
reputation. Another example is In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,
where the court found that Verizon had a sufficient stake in the
litigation because of its interest in maintaining and broadening its
client base.116
The second requirement—that there be some sort of relationship
between the litigant and the third party117—is also likely easily
satisfied. As noted above, this type of relationship is merely a
functional relationship, such that the litigant will be an effective
advocate of the rights of the third party. If the Court allows
bartenders to assert the rights of unknown underage drinkers,118 or
booksellers to assert the rights of unknown juvenile customers,119 it
seems reasonable that an organization (such as an ISP, an
association, or the press) could assert the rights of anonymous
speakers who trusted that organization with their identities.120
The third, and arguably most difficult, requirement for third
parties to achieve is that there must be some hindrance to the
anonymous speaker preventing him or her from asserting his or her
own rights.121 At first blush, one might attempt to argue that the
obvious hindrance is that through engaging in litigation, the party
will risk disclosing his or her identity. However, the Court has made
clear that it is possible for anonymous parties to contest the unveiling
of their identities through use of pseudonyms, thus engaging in
litigation while still masking their identity.122 At least one court has
argued that the desire of a speaker to preserve his or her identity is
116. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds, RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
117. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991).
118. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
119. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
120. However, it should be noted that some courts have found the relationship between
organizations such as an ISP, an association, or the press and an anonymous speaker lacking,
though clear justification for such a determination has yet to be given. See, e.g., Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a hedge fund
manager did not have standing to defend the rights of anonymous speakers who made
potentially defamatory statements that were traced to the hedge fund).
121. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991); see also, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953) (finding third-party standing appropriate because the homeowner brought the suit on
behalf of black men excluded from the neighborhood by a homeowner’s covenant and the
black man would never be able to assert standing since he could never own a house in the
neighborhood, which constituted a sufficient hindrance to the party from bringing his own
rights before the court).
122. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973).
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not a valid “hindrance” preventing the party from asserting his or
her own rights.123 The Quixtar court argued that the only cases
where a court should find that a true hindrance existed, preventing
the speaker from asserting personal rights, would be cases in which a
party was never put on notice that the divulgence of his or her
identity is pending in litigation.124 However, the range of cases in
which the speakers are unaware of the litigation, and thus truly
unable to defend their own rights, is likely small.
In the majority of cases, it is likely that the third-party standing
requirements would need to be relaxed in order to achieve the
maximum protections for anonymous speakers. It would not be
unusual for the Court to relax these standards because standing
requirements are already interpreted quite liberally in other areas of
First Amendment jurisprudence.125 For example, the Supreme Court
created an exception to the third-party standing requirements by
allowing statutes to be invalidated on overbreadth or vagueness
grounds.126 In such cases, a litigant is given third-party standing to
challenge the constitutionality of an overbroad127 or vague128 statute
even if the litigant has not personally suffered an injury (meaning
that the litigant has not engaged in constitutionally protected activity
that the statute makes unlawful) and even if the litigant has not
proven that a significant hindrance exists to other parties preventing
them from asserting their own rights if affected by the statute.
According to Fallon, “[t]he most common account of the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine justif[ying] a departure from
ordinary standing principles” is that “the foundation for the doctrine
is prophylactic: its purpose is to combat chilling effects and other
123. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1213–14 (D.
Nev. 2008).
124. Id. at 1216 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 411).
125. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds, RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
126. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971).
127. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. See also Richard Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth,
100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (“When speech or expressive activity forms a significant part of
a law’s target, the law is subject to facial challenge and invalidation if: (i) it is ‘substantially
overbroad’—that is, if its illegitimate applications are too numerous ‘judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’ and (ii) no constitutionally adequate narrowing construction
suggests itself.”); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808
(1969); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
128. Coates, 402 U.S. 611.
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impediments to constitutionally valuable expression.”129 The First
Amendment is viewed as enjoying “a special status in the
constitutional scheme,” and “any substantial ‘chilling’ of
constitutionally protected expression is intolerable.”130 Justice
Brennan articulated the need to stave off chilling effects in Walker v.
City of Birmingham:
To give [First Amendment] freedoms the necessary “breathing
space to survive,” the Court has modified traditional rules of
standing and prematurity. We have molded both substantive rights
and procedural remedies in the face of varied conflicting interests to
conform to our overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the
“chilling effect” upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms
generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion to
limit their exercise.131

As one commentator explained, “the doctrine emphasizes the
need to eliminate [a] law’s deterrent impact—or ‘chilling effect’—on
protected primary activity.”132 The reason being that “[a] chill on
protected activity also means deterrence of the very litigants whose
complaint is necessary under the as applied method to [challenge the
law]. The results are delay in according judicial protection and
irretrievable loss of exercise of fundamental rights.”133
This same justification for relaxing standing requirements in the
overbreadth and vagueness realm exists in regards to anonymous
speakers: namely, there is a very real concern that forcing anonymous
speakers to defend their rights in court, even under a pseudonym,
will have a definite chilling effect upon anonymous discourse on the
Internet. If anonymous speakers are forced to defend themselves in
lawsuits, when their obvious goal was to avoid being noticed or
heckled, then we are still effectively chilling anonymous speech.
Let us take the example of Solers, where the anonymous speaker
was aware of the suit but chose not to intervene and allowed the
trade association to litigate on his behalf.134 If the trade association
had not been allowed to assert third-party standing, and each
129.
130.
131.
132.
(1970).
133.
134.
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Fallon, supra note 127, at 867–68.
Id. at 867.
388 U.S. 307, 344–45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 853
Id. at 855.
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009).
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anonymous tipster were forced to defend himself or herself in court,
the chance that this tipster, or any other individual aware of the
lawsuit, would be motivated to anonymously report possible illegal
behaviors by companies in the future would be significantly
diminished. Indeed, anonymous speakers would self-censor in order
to avoid the hassle and expense of litigation—the essence of a
chilling effect.
Another example is Enterline v. Pocono Medical Center, where a
news organization asserted third-party standing on behalf of the
anonymous speakers who had commented on a news story.135 In this
case, the court observed that preventing the news organization from
asserting standing would “compromise the vitality of the newspaper’s
online forums, sparking reduced reader interest.”136 Such a
phenomenon is not surprising, when one considers that the
motivation for a speaker to engage in lively debate on a news forum
diminishes substantially if the speaker knows he or she may have to
defend his or her rights in court, rather than rely on the newspaper
to do so.
Other courts and commentators have also noted the unique
danger of a chilling effect occurring in this area of speech.137 This
danger “justif[ies] the relaxation of rules which inhibit the litigation
of constitutional claims in the federal courts,”138 particularly the
requirement that an anonymous speaker have some true hindrance
(e.g., not being aware of the litigation) preventing the speaker from
135. Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-cv-1934, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 11, 2008).
136. Id. at *3.
137. See, e.g., Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214
(D. Nev. 2008) (“To fail to protect anonymity is, therefore, to chill speech.”); Doe v.
2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“If Internet users
could be stripped of that anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil
discovery, this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on
basic First Amendment rights.”); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005)
(“[S]etting the standard too low will chill potential posters from exercising their First
Amendment right to speak anonymously. The possibility of losing anonymity in a future
lawsuit could intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments or simply not
commenting at all.”); see also Lidsky, supra note 6, at 882 (arguing that the mere threat of
being revealed may be enough to force a defendant to temper his remarks in the future); Jones,
supra note 70, at 443 (“When the threat of later being identified exists, without a strong
presumption in favor of keeping the speaker’s identity hidden, it has a chilling effect on the
speaker.”).
138. Note, The Chilling Effect and Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 809
(1969).
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asserting his or her own rights in court. The desire of the anonymous
speaker to remain discreet and un-heckled, coupled with the
determination that the third-party organization will adequately
represent the speaker’s rights, should be sufficient.
Furthermore, one of the traditional justifications for third-party
standing, that we do not want the court to unnecessarily litigate
rights of litigants, does not apply in this scenario. The rights of the
anonymous speaker are going to be litigated, at least to some extent,
one way or another, since the premise of these types of cases is that
the plaintiff has already filed a suit and is seeking discovery of the
anonymous speaker’s identity. Thus, the question is not whether
someone will have to engage in litigation to defend the anonymous
speaker’s rights, but rather who should be allowed to do it. The use
of third-party standing is justified when the plaintiff has attempted to
notify the anonymous speakers of the litigation, and the speaker is
uninterested in intervening, or worse—unaware of the litigation.
Such an option will provide greatly needed additional protections for
anonymous speakers, while not adding any additional legal hurdles
for the plaintiff to overcome in order to obtain a remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to preserve the valuable democratic and communicative
nature of the Internet, anonymous Internet speech must be given
full First Amendment protection. Though at times such speech may
be potentially defamatory, and thus possibly deserving of civil
penalties, it is important to remember that the identity of an
anonymous speaker is a separate type of speech entirely and that
compelling that speech requires heightened protections not
sufficiently provided by any one test currently implemented by
courts. This Comment argues that the proper test is as follows: first,
after determining as a threshold matter that the speaker had a
reasonable expectation of anonymity in his or her speech, the
plaintiff must secondly be able to allege sufficient facts to support a
fairly plausible, rather than merely conceivable, claim for relief.
Third, the plaintiff must prove that the knowledge of the speaker’s
identity is materially related to a core claim or defense and that this
information is unavailable from other sources; in essence, this
requirement would impose a level of protection similar to that of
strict scrutiny. And finally, the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts,
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if necessary, to notify the speaker of the litigation so that the speaker
may intervene and assert his or her own rights if he or she desires.
However, this Comment suggests that the speaker should not be
the only one allowed to assert his or her First Amendment rights,
but that traditional third-party standing requirements should be
relaxed so that the organization entrusted with the speaker’s identity
can have the option of asserting standing on the speaker’s behalf.
Such an option would provide additional protections for anonymous
speakers by preventing a chilling effect on anonymous speech and by
leveling the playing field of litigation, yet this option would not
require the aggrieved plaintiff to overcome any additional legal
hurdles to obtain a remedy.
Stephanie Barclay
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